Athanasius and the Atonement
An Exposition and Critical Estimate of Athanasius' Doctrine of the Atonement (with special reference to De Incarnatione)
Peter J. Blackburn, Theology B, 1962
2. The Nature and Extent of Human Need
Humanity and characteristics as created; the Fall and its consequences; the resultant dilemma between the justice and goodness of God
3. The Incarnation of the Word
The Incarnation as the Atonement; the Death of Christ mystically achieving the Atonement because of the Incarnation - in each passage considered, to what extent is this apparent interpretation in fact true?
4. The Death of Christ
Word took instead of all the death due to all; the offering of an equivalent and a ransom-price. Summary of doctrine - mystical and vicarious, with emphasis on the latter.
Possible change through later emphasis on moral corruption of sin and the influence of this on the doctrine of the Incarnation; balance of aspects basically the same.
Critical estimate - speculative point of view, especially as affecting mystical aspect; deficiency and strength of doctrines of Fall and Incarnation; Christ's giving of his body to death, yet avoids Docetism; breadth of thought through Scriptural basis.
N.B. Except where indicated, references to Athanasius' work are to his De Incarnatione.
Athanasius did not write a work specifically on the Atonement. The doctrine, however, received its most systematic presentation in his De Incarnatione. This is so because of the close relation for him between the Incarnation and the Atonement. The Atonement was the whole purpose of the Incarnation. It was natural for him, therefore, to expound this doctrine in his consideration of the Incarnation. As Quasten writes, "Thus Athanasius infers the necessity of the incarnation and of the death of Christ from God's redeeming will. We would not have been redeemed, if God himself had not become man and if Christ were not God."1. This, then, is why a doctrine of the Atonement is sought in a treatise on the Incarnation.
J.K. Mozley wrote, "Unfortunately, the only treatise which deals with the subject at all systematically is his earliest - De Incarnatione - and the tendency to expound Athanasius by almost exclusive reference to this work is deplorable."2 It may be added that this tendency has persisted in the more recent expositions of his doctrine. It is not customary to regard a treatise written about the age of twenty as one's mature thought on a particular subject! The scope of this essay has been restricted by lack of access to other source material. It has been considered best to expound Athanasius' doctrine as it appears in De Incarnatione, indicating the lines of development the doctrine took in later years. For this latter it has been necessary - and deplorably so - to depend on the observations of others and to assess the merits of these as far as possible.
2. The Nature and Extent of Human Need
In considering Athanaaius' doctrine of the Atonement, it is necessary first to appreciate his doctrine of the Fall and its consequences for the human race. It is only in the light of this that his statements on the Atonement can be understood.
God brought the universe into existence out of nothing by means of the Word.3 Among all the things that he had created on earth, however, he had pity on (elehsaV) the human race and perceived that they were not adequate by reason of their origin to endure always.4 Therefore he gave them a further gift, making them after his own image (kata thn eautou eikona),5 giving them also the power of his own Word, thus distinguishing them from the irrational creatures (aloga zwa) on the earth. The purpose of this was that people, having as it were a kind of reflection of the Word (Logou) and being made rational (logikoi), might be able to abide6 in blessedness, living the true life which belongs to the saints in paradise.
Since people had a will which was able to sway to either side, God sought in advance to secure the grace given to them by bringing them into his own Garden and giving them a law. Circumstances, then, were made as favourable as possible without actually taking away their freedom of will.7 The "law" appears to refer to the promise and the warning - the promise that, if they kept the grace and remained good, they would continue to keep the life in paradise without sorrow or pain or care (thn en paradeisw alupon kai anwdunon kai amerimnon zwhn), in addition to having the promise of incorruption (afqarsiaV) in heaven; the warning that, if they transgressed and, turning back, became bad, they would know that they were incurring that corruption (fqoran) in death which was theirs by nature (kata fusin), no longer to live in paradise, but dying from that time forth to remain in death and in corruption.8
It is to be noted that he considers people in their original constitution as not inherently incorruptible or immortal. The promise of incorruption was conditional on their remaining in grace. Their creation in God's image and participation in the Word, though directed to their continued life, did not infallibly guarantee it.
Humanity,9 however, despised and rejected this contemplation of God, devised (logisamenoi) and contrived for themselves evil (kakian) and received the condemnation of death threatened beforehand. No longer did they remain as they were made (wV gegonasi) but were corrupted (diefqeironto) according to their devices (wV elogizonto), and death had mastery over them as king. Transgression of the commandment was turning them back to their natural state (to kata fusin) so that, as they had their being from nothing, so they could expect corruption into nothing (eiV to mh einai) in the course of time. Having turned from what was distinctively theirs, they became no more than the rest of creation. For by nature (kata fusin) people are mortal (qnhtoV), in that they are made from what is not - i.e. from the creaturely point of view - but by reason of their likeness to God who is10 (provided that they kept this by keeping him in knowledge), they would stay their natural corruption (thn kata fusin fqoran) and remain incorrupt (afqartoV) - i.e. from that aspect which was intended to be characteristic of humanity. The existence of people was never meant to be kata fusin on the common basis of all creatures, but they were freely given by the grace of the Word a life which was to be kata Qeon.11 People were meant to be kept from corruption by the Word dwelling with them (ton susonta toutoiV Logon). The rejection of this gift meant that people in fact lived kata fusin, thence to abide in death and corruption. Not only, however, did people sin, but they sinned to excess, devising all manner of new evils, vying with one another in law-breaking. The human race was thus perishing and death was gaining legal hold over people because God, having spoken, could not prove false.
The result was a dilemma - monstrous (atopon) and unseemly (aprepeV).12 It would be monstrous if God, having spoken, should prove false. God's declaration of death as the consequence for transgression of the commandment could not be broken - in this God had to be true to what he had laid down. It would be monstrous for the Father of truth to appear a liar for our profit and preservation. On the other hand, it would be unseemly that creatures once made rational and having partaken of the Word should go to ruin and turn again to nonexistence by way of corruption. Such a course of events was not worthy of the goodness of God. But it was especially unseemly that God's handiwork among people should be done away either by their own carelessness, or because of the deceitfulness of evil spirits. What course could God take which would be consistent with both his justice and his goodness? Repentance would be insufficient to guard the reasonable claim (to eulogon) of God - since it would not vindicate the truthfulness of God in the original threat of death - and, though repentance stays people from acts of sin (amarthmatwn), it does not call people back from what is their nature (apo twn kata fusin). It is not merely the particular misdemeanour which is in question but rather the subsequent corruption. Corruption is here regarded as the whole corruption of human nature, not merely (though issuing in) the corruption which comes in death.
3. The Incarnation of the Word
For Athanasius, only the Word of God who made the world from nothing could provide the grace and recall necessary to remedy the situation. His argument concerning the necessity of the Incarnation are not the concern of this study. It is here, however, that the mystical element in his conception of the Atonement is most marked.
In some sense, the Incarnation is the Atonement - i.e. the very fact that the Word took on our humanity has redeemed and saved it. Whether this is actually his major approach to the Atonement is a matter for later discussion. His use of different terms makes it difficult to give a precise and rigid definition of his doctrine, and especially at this point his other emphases are likely to modify the interpretation of those passages most quoted in favour of a mystical doctrine.
In emphasising the importance of the Incarnation since the Atonement could not be achieved merely by divine fiat,13 he declares that the Saviour put on (enedusato) a body, so that the body, becoming closely bound to the Life, should no longer, as mortal (wV qnhton), abide in death, but, as having put on (endusamenon) immortality (aqanasian), should thenceforth rise again and remain immortal. The reason for putting on the body was to find death in the body and blot it out. His very presence in the body meant that the body was quickened, no longer being subject to corruption and death. The dying and rising were to demonstrate his victory over corruption and death - a victory which, having taken place in his body by the Incarnation itself, avails for all men.
It is here that Athanasius used the figure of asbestos (amiantw). Stubble is naturally (fusei) destructible by fire, and this natural property is not altered by keeping it away from fire. If, however, it is encased in asbestos which is the antidote (antipaqeV) of fire, its enclosure in incombustible matter secures it from the threat of the fire. This figure relates to the body and death, so that the body, having now put on (enedusato) the incorruptible Son of God, no longer fears either death or corruption, having life as a garment (enduma) and corruption done away in it. This could be taken as referring to our Lord's body only and not to any mystical idea at all. However, the reference to the body and death appears to be purely general and goes back to his former discussion of whether corruption could be stayed by a mere command. Perhaps there is intended to be significance in the reversal of the metaphor of clothing (though it is seen above that this does occur earlier with reference to his own body). With reference to the Incarnation the Saviour is said to have put on a body - it was therefore his "clothing" while on earth, though not part of his eternal nature, and quickened by him. In the Incarnation - his putting on of a body - the body (in an abstract sense - potentially for all, actually for believers) became, as it were, clothed in him.
Later14 he describes the purpose of the Incarnation in the words, "For he put on humanity that we might be made divine."15 This has been taken by many as the key statement in seeing Athanasius' mystical idea of the Atonement. Unfortunately, this by no means follows from the passage itself. The construction indicates purpose rather than result, and the context does not specify that the act of Incarnation itself is in mind. He does specifically say that by the Incarnation (enanqrwphsewV) of the Word the universal providence has been known, and its giver and artificer the very Word of God.This, however, seems to be a direct allusion to the works of Christ which he has been discussing immediately before this. The two other clauses of which this is the basis state that by so ordinary a means things divine have been manifested to us, and that by death immortality has reached to all. Whether the former of these refers to the act of Incarnation itself or again to the works of Christ does not directly bear on the question. The latter, however, refers at least the regain of immortality (aqanasia) to the death (tou qanatou) - obviously the Death of Christ.
The only clue from the immediate context, therefore, indicates that it was what the incarnate Word did (here specifically the offering of himself in death), rather than the act of Incarnation itself, that was to achieve the stated purpose. Considered with respect to the rest of this work, the much-quoted saying can only be interpreted according to the interpretation of the whole, since it merely affirms the purpose of the Word's becoming a human being and not at all the method by which Atonement was achieved. The statement is parallel in meaning to those at the beginning of section IV, where human transgression is described as the reason (aitia) of his coming down (2), and our salvation as the purpose (dia with the accusative) for which he appeared and was born even in a human body (3). The text at this point can certainly hardly support the statement of T.H. Hughes: "His (Athanasius') idea is summed up in his well-known saying, 'He became human that we might become divine.' So his coming into human nature is sufficient to make it divine in such a way that man shares the life of God. Athanasius does not wholly neglect the death of Christ, for he assigns some place to his experiences on the Cross, but the prevailing idea is that of God in his grace and love coming into humanity as a health-giving presence, and by this fact man is redeemed and lifted up to union with God."16 As far as this passage from Athanasius is concerned, the opposite, if any, is likely to be the case.
There are several passages in which the Death of Christ is emphasised but seems to be given a mystical interpretation. It is convenient to consider these under this section, since the mystical interpretation comes by way of the concept of the Incarnation.
Thus, in section IX, he refers to the necessity of death for the release of humanity from corruption. Now while he speaks of the satisfying of a debt by means of an equivalent, he goes on that "as being conjoined to all by a like nature,17 the incorruptible Son of God naturally clothed all with incorruption in the promise concerning the resurrection." The law involving people's ruin expended its power on the Lord's body in his death,18 but that this was not solely a sacrificial offering is seen in his emphasis on the resurrection as being the clothing of all in incorruption. The emphasis here is not so much that the Incarnation itself was the Atonement, but rather that, because of the Incarnation, the natures of all people in some way participate in him so that in his Death the death of all is accomplished and the resurrection of all in him.
This is seen later19 where, having first stated that the debt of death owing from all had to be paid, he continued that "the death of all was accomplished in the Lord's body,20 and death and corruption were done away by reason of the Word united with it." Yet it may well be argued that the mystical element is not as strong here as in the previous example, for "the death of all" (o pantwn qanatoV) is taken as equivalent to "death on behalf of all" (qanaton uper pantwn), and reference is made to Christ's offering of his body "instead of all" (anti pantwn). The context here seems to indicate, not that the death of all was mystically accomplished in Christ since he was united with our human nature in the Incarnation, but that his suffering was to satisfy a debt. "The death of all" is therefore the debt due to all on account of sin. The statement of the present passage concerns the vicarious, rather than the mystical, aspect of the fulfilment of this death.
The same may be said of his statement21 that "the Saviour came to accomplish not his own death but the death of men." His Death was essentially "death for the salvation of all" (qanaton uper thV pantwn swthriaV). It was not his own death, for being Life he could have no death properly called his own, but received the death which was from humanity in order to do away with it when it met him in his own body. This could be regarded mystically more readily than the preceding passage, since death was to be done away by meeting him in the body - i.e. in the humanity which was united with the divinity and thus by nature incorruptible. That death "met him in his own body" points to the deliberateness of act by which it was necessary for him to be put to death. It was still, however, something done "on behalf of the salvation of all."
The earlier use of the figure of asbestos22 confirms this point with regard to death. However potentially Christ's Death is humanity's (in the mystical sense), the reality of the victory comes only by being "in Christ", by receiving "the faith of Christ" and passing over to his teaching. This is the victory of faith rather than a mystically wrought change in the essential constitution of humanity.
4. The Death of Christ
Already in the above discussion, some indication has been given of the importance of the Death of Christ for Athanasius' doctrine of the Atonement. He considers the death of Christ's body to be the sum (to kefalaion) of our faith.23 The terms in which he describes the Death of Christ are largely those of Scripture and care needs to be taken to see them in their plain sense rather than in the light of later developments and controversy.
It was in the human situation under the domination of death and corruption that the Word of God took from among our bodies one of like nature (to omoion). Because all were under the penalty of the corruption of death, he gave it over to death instead of all (anti pantwn).24 This accomplished two things: the power of the law of death was exhausted in his body, and people could now be turned again to incorruption. This latter was effected by the appropriation of his body (th swmatoV idiopoihsei) and by the grace of the resurrection. The latter of these is referred to on several occasions throughout the work. He appears to regard the resurrection as the act of victory over corruption.25
It was only by death that corruption could be undone.26 The Word, therefore, took a body capable of death, worthy, by its partaking of the Word, to die instead of all (anti pantwn), and yet, because of the Word, remaining incorruptible and staying incorruption from all. His body, offered unto death, was an offering and a sacrifice (iereion kai quma) free from stain - he put away death from his peers by the offering of an equivalent (katallhlou). "For being over all, the Word of God naturally by offering his own temple and corporeal instrument as an antiyucon on behalf of all (uper pantwn) satisfied (eplhrou) the debt in his death." Although neither of the two key words here, katallhloV and antiyucoV, are found in the canonical Scriptures,27 they convey a Scriptural idea. Both of them have the significance here of a life given instead of another's.
His symbolic arguments in XXV for the necessity of the Cross as the means of Christ's Death seem far-fetched and irrelevant today. However, in this section he does describe the Atonement in terms from the Scriptures. The Lord came to bear the curse laid on us. He became a curse by receiving the death set for a curse - that is, the cross (following the reasoning of Gal. 3.13). He further describes the Death of the Lord as "the ransom of all" (o qanatoV tou Kuriou lutron esti pantwn). If there is difficulty among scholars in ascertaining the extent to which the New Testament use of lutron involves the idea of a price paid, there is even more here where the word is probably used in a New Testament or "technical" sense. Certainly in the two New Testament occurrences of the word28 the idea of a price is more difficult to suppress than with apolutrwsiV. At the weakest the Biblical idea indicates a life given instead of that of others. In any case, in the Athanasian context, it is plain that the curse borne in death was that laid upon us29 and hence that lutron is parallel in force to katallhloV and antiyucoV above.
Reference has already been made to several passages where the Death of Christ appears on a superficial reading to be given a mystical interpretation. Although there is certainly a mystical element in some passages, it has been seen that in many such cases the reference that our death has been accomplished in the Lord's body united with his divinity is vicarious rather than mystical when examined in relation to its context.
It would be a mistake to attempt classification of Athanasius' doctrine of the Atonement. His use largely of Scriptural concepts makes him appear a protagonist of various so-called "theories" of the Atonement - according to the particular set of "proof-texts" taken from his work. Two major aspects of his interpretation have been noted, yet perhaps he cannot satisfactorily be tied down even to these.
There is certainly a great emphasis on the Incarnation and its importance, but it is not easy to discover to what extent he considers its primary importance as making the Death of Christ possible. Certainly, there are passages where he emphasises the Incarnation itself as a purification of our human nature and the doing away of corruption and death. Yet he can never avoid the fact that corruption and death are not merely an unfortunate consequence of sin, but a punishment due to us on account of our sin. The law of God must be satisfied, and this takes place in the Death of Christ who died in our stead as an equivalent, a ransom, whose body was an offering and sacrifice free from stain - but sometimes even this Death is regarded mystically as the death of all in him. Even this, however, is probably derived from Pauline statements rather than deliberately set forth as a mystical interpretation of the Death of Christ. The De Incarnatione itself gives a strong impression of an approach which is centrally vicarious and substitutionary.
While it is true that Athanasius' only treatise which deals at all systematically with the Atonement is his earliest, the De Incarnatione, it is important to ascertain as far as possible if, and to what extent, he changed his emphasis later.
M. Scott30 makes out a case for holding that Athanasius progressed from his first view of the Atonement as an "external transaction" to that of an "internal process" - a sanctification of human nature first in Christ, and potentially for all humanity. His final doctrine in this interpretation was not one of substitution, but of a double metathesis, "as Christ took what was ours, so we are able to receive what was his, i.e. not his Divinity, which is incommunicable, but his perfected Humanity." Scott argues that in the Incarnation the human nature taken by the Word was fallen and "inclined to sin", "corrupt", and "in bondage."31
The change indicated here, however, implies primarily a difference of emphasis in his doctrine of the Fall. The chief concern in the former work appears to be with death and corruption, and the loss of the image of God. By this conception, Christ took a body in which death and corruption were possible. He offered it to death, but corruption was stayed because it was united to the Word. Now with a greater emphasis on moral than on physical corruption, it is necessary that he take a human nature capable of this moral corruption, though preserved free from actual sin. Humanity as a whole, originally created after the image of the Word, is restored in the Word made flesh. Basically, this is the same mystical element present in his earlier work, couched in terms representing a modified emphasis in the doctrine of the Fall. He still, however, maintained the distinction between the Word and the humanity taken on by him.
J.K. Mozley, however, points out that "at the same time we must recognise another side to his teaching, not confined to the De Incarnatione,... concerned with the death of Christ as the payment of a debt which man cannot pay... It is not easy to see exactly what the debt is... But that full payment is made in Christ's death is clear and neither from the De Incarnatione, nor from passages in later works,32 can we expunge the idea of substitution..."33. Certainly this has been evident in the study of his earlier work. It is deplorable that the unavailability of further source material makes adequate documentation or criticism of these assessments impossible.
If these comments are valid, they seem to indicate that basically Athanasius' later emphasis was very similar to that found in his earlier work. His interest in the Incarnation was further stimulated by the Arian controversy in which, however, his primary concern was to maintain that only one truly Divine was adequate to achieve human salvation. But this was also key to both aspects of the Atonement seen in his earlier work. It is true of his later work, as of his former, that no matter in what aspects or to what extent the Atonement was achieved by the act of Incarnation itself, the Death of Christ was necessary as a substitutionary act.
In assessing Athanasius' doctrine of the Atonement, something ought first to be said concerning the centrality of "the speculative point of view"34 in his work. One often feels that the argument he attributes to logical necessity is not particularly related to the Biblical record of Christ. Thus, care must be taken not simply to criticise his conclusion that Christ had to die on a cross since only thus were his arms open to all men, Jew and Gentile alike, or since by being raised into the air he would overcome the prince of the air. Basically this method of thought is the same as that which produces those passages dealing with the Atonement in a mystical way. The one and the other must be criticised together as faulty method.
Denny attributes the speculative bent to "the structure and constitution of the Greek mind."35 Constructively, it is suggested that his doctrine would have been more unified and better founded if his mysticism had been more specifically based on faith in Christ rather than on speculative parallelisms and symbolical deductions. This is surely the touch-stone of the mysticism of Paul on whom Athanasius has quite plainly drawn. For Paul, en Cristw is primarily a faith relationship.
This tendency to speculation has somewhat weakened the doctrines of the Fall and the Incarnation. They have strength, however, in the emphasis on the gravity of the consequences of the Fall, on the human inability to avert these consequences, and on the divinity of the one who died in the stead of all. Any theory which fails to take account of the former two ends in a shallow and inadequate exposition of the place of the Death of Christ, while any which neglects the latter leads to a dichotomy between the justice and mercy of God. Quite rightly Athanasius urges that is was necessary for Christ to die and that in his Death is seen the act of God.
This same defect, however, is carried over in his approach to the Death of Christ in relation to the Atonement. It has already been noted that he uses for the most part Biblical concepts, especially the vicarious and substitutionary. However, not even in his later work does he permit that the Word suffered. He would always make a logical distinction between the Word and the flesh he put on. It was the body of Christ, made perfect by the indwelling Word, that suffered. Christ gave his hody to death for us. Athanasius could never have spoken of Christ as divine and human in an equal sense - essentially his body was his corporeal instrument, a garment which he had put on.
The distinction which he makes is best seen by quotation - "When the inspired writers speak of him as eating and being born, understand that the body, as body, was born, and sustained with food corresponding to its nature, while God the Word himself, who was united with the body, while ordering all things, also by the works he did in the body showed himself to be, not man, but God the Word."36
The distinction that he applies to "the inspired writers" is surely also to be applied to himself. He does on occasion speak of the Saviour dying on our behalf, but it is always to be remembered that such things are only spoken of the body and are predicated of Christ only in so far as he was united to the body. His strength here is that he does avoid Docetism in that Christ had a real body which underwent real suffering and a real death. That Christ was united with the body in suffering and even in death is clear from his assertion that this was the ground of the body's incorruption and its resurrection. His problem is the continuing problem of Christology - how could Christ be both fully human and fully divine?
In surveying the various aspects of Athanasius' doctrine, the breadth of his thought must be acknowledged. Even if he is at times rather too speculative for the modern mind, and if he brings together what seem to us to be quite distinctive doctrines, he at least draws on the Scriptures as his basis.37 Undoubtedly, this is why several of the later "theories" are detectable in him. Although he was inclined to a kind of logical speculation, these aspects of the Atonement were not regarded as mutually exclusive.
Certainly if any choice must be made, his central emphasis is the Death of Christ as in our stead, the death due to us on account of our sin. Yet though this appears more central than the mystical idea of the Incarnation as the Atonement, the latter is present, but not in as great a degree as has been sometimes maintained.
1 J. Quasten, Patrology (Spectrum, Antwerp, 1960) vol. 3, p. 71.
2 The Doctrine of the Atonement (Duckworth, London, 1915), p. 105.
3 De Incarnatione, III.1,3.
4 diamenein aei - this may indicate that humanity as created (or, as a creature?) was not naturally immortal.
5 Cf. Gen. 1.26, LXX - kat' eikona hmeteran kai kaq' omoiwsin.
6 A. Robertson translates "abide forever". This is an inference from the present infinitive diamenein and certainly represents Athanasius' thought here. Aei is undoubtedly to be understood.
7 This is not modified by his later (IV.4) statement, menein hqelhsen en afqarsia.
8 He quotes Gen. 2.16,17 in support of his emphasis on corruption, maintaining that this is implied by qanatw apoqaneisqe. The Heb. construction there, however, is rather emphasising the certainty of death.
10 ton onta, i.e. "God". Cf. o wn, Ex. 3.14, LXX.
15 autoV gar enhnqrwphsen, ina hmeiV qeopoihqwmen.
16 The Atonement (Allen & Unwin, London, 1949), p. 234.
17 wV sunwn de dia tou omoiou paV pasin.
20 o pantwn qanatoV en tw Kuriake swmati eplhrounto.
25 Certainly this is the interpretation at XXI.1.
27 antiyucon is found in LXX only at 4 Macc. 6.29; 17.22
28 Matt. 20.28 = Mk 10.45 - dounai thn autou lutron anti pollwn.
29 thn kaq' hmwn genomenhn kataran.
30 Athanasius on the Atonement, cited J.K. Mozley, op. cit., p. 105ff.
31 Quotations from Athanasius in Ps. XXII.30; c. Ar. IV.33; ibid., I.43.
32 This is documented with footnote references to c. Ar. I.60; II.66.
33 op. cit., pp. 106-107.
34 See J. Denney, The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1919), p. 36ff.
35 ibid. p. 35.
F.L. Cross Athanasius De Incarnatione, an Edition of the Greek Text (S.P.C.K., London, 1939)
E.R. Hardy & C.C. Richardson (eds.) Christology of the Later Fathers, vol. 3, Library of Christian Classics (S.C.M., London, 1954)
S. Cave The Doctrine of the Work of Christ (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1937)
J. Denney The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1919)
J. Hastings (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics vol. 2 (T & T Clark, Edinburgh, 1909)
T.H. Hughes The Atonement: Modern Theories of the Doctrine (Allen & Unwin, London, 1949)
J.S. Lidgett The Scriptural Principle of the Atonement (Culley, London, n.d., [4th ed.])
J.K. Mozley The Doctrine of the Atonement (Duckworth, London, 1915)
R.S. Paul The Atonement and the Sacraments (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1961)
J. Quasten Patrology, vol. 3 (Spectrum, Antwerp, 1960)
© Peter J. Blackburn, 1962, 1999
Note: In making this essay available on the Internet, Greek text has been changed from Graeca font to Symbol True Type font. This has meant presenting it without breathing marks, accents and subscripts.
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